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Private Military Firms and Responses to Their 
Accountability Gap 
John S. Kemp  
INTRODUCTION 
On September 16, 2007, a bomb exploded near Nisour Square in 
Baghdad, Iraq.
1
 The United States responded by sending 
Blackwater—a private military firm (―PMF‖) contracted to work for 
the United States—to the square.2 Shortly thereafter, Ahmed Haithem 
Ahmed, an Iraqi citizen, approached the area in his car with his 
mother.
3
 He did not know that a bomb had been detonated nearby 
earlier in the day; his destination was the hospital, where his father 
worked.
4
  
A convoy of four Blackwater security vans approached the street 
where Ahmed and his mother were driving. A Blackwater employee 
fired a shot at Ahmed‘s car, striking him in the head and killing him 
instantly.
5
 He slumped onto the steering wheel, his foot still on the 
pedal.
6
 As his car continued to approach the security vans, the 
Blackwater convoy opened automatic fire at the car and civilians 
standing nearby.
7
  
 
  J.D. (2010), Washington University School of Law; B.A., History (2007), University 
of Nebraska–Lincoln. 
 1. James Glanz & Alissa J. Rubin, From Errand to Fatal Shot To Hail of Fire to 17 
Deaths, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 3, 2007, at A1. 
 2. Id. Blackwater changed its company name to ―Xe‖ in early 2009. Because most of the 
events described in this Note concern the period during which the company was known by 
―Blackwater,‖ I refer to it as such. Upon the change in names, the company stated it would 
begin to focus primarily on training instead of security services. Associated Press, Blackwater 
Changes Its Name to Xe, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2009, at A10. 
 3. Glanz & Rubin, supra note 1, at A1. 
 4. Id.  
 5. Id. 
 6. Id.  
 7. Id. 
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When the shooting stopped, Ahmed and his mother, along with 
fifteen other Iraqis, were dead.
8
 According to the subsequent FBI 
investigation, ―at least 14 of the shootings were unjustified.‖9  
The Iraqis were outraged.
10
 The United States Congress likewise 
reacted with indignation.
11
 David Price, a Democratic representative 
from North Carolina, sponsored the MEJA Expansion and 
Enforcement Act of 2007 (H.R. 2740), which the House passed on 
October 4, 2007.
12
 The bill was intended to update the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act of 2000 (―MEJA‖).13 H.R. 2740 
proposed adding language to MEJA to clarify that the United States 
has jurisdiction to hold contractors liable under American criminal 
law for prohibited conduct committed in regions where the Armed 
Forces are engaged in contingency operations.
14
 
 
 8. Id. See also Walter Pincus, Private Iraq Investigators out: Agency Cancels Contract 
after Senator Raises Questions, WASH. POST, Oct. 22, 2008, at A17. 
 9. David Johnston & John M. Broder, F.B.I. Says Guards Killed 14 Iraqis without 
Cause, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 14, 2007, at A1. Early FBI findings indicated that Blackwater 
employees ―recklessly used lethal force.‖ Id. Blackwater initially responded to the incident by 
arguing that the convoy‘s actions were both justified and lawful because they had been 
attacked. However, Iraqi investigators found no evidence of any such attack. James Glanz & 
Alissa J. Rubin, Blackwater Shootings ‘Deliberate Murder,’ Iraq Says, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 
2007, at A6. Additionally, a ―separate military review of the Sept. 16 shootings concluded that 
all of the killings were unjustified and potentially criminal.‖ Johnston & Broder, supra, at A12; 
see also Glanz & Rubin, supra note 1, at A1.  
 10. Prime Minister Nuri Kamal al-Maliki said: ―The Iraqi government is responsible for 
its citizens, and it cannot be accepted for a security company to carry out a killing. There are 
serious challenges to the sovereignty of Iraq.‖ Alissa J. Rubin & Andrew E. Kramer, Iraqi 
Premier Says Blackwater Shootings Challenge His Nation’s Sovereignty, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 24, 
2007, at A6. See also Glanz & Rubin, supra note 9, at A6 (noting that the Iraqi prime minister‘s 
office described the shootings as ―deliberate murder‖ and called for the case to be tried in 
court). 
 11. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. H11,214-15 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Conyers) (calling for regulation of contractors after the September shootings). 
 12. MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. (2007).  
 13. 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267 (2006). 
 14. See H.R. 2740. The main purpose of the Act is ―to require accountability for 
contractors and contract personnel under Federal contracts . . . .‖ 153 CONG. REC. H11,214 
(daily ed. Oct. 3, 2007). The Blackwater shooting was the impetus for bringing House Bill 2740 
before the House. See id. There were other reasons as well. First, no clear legal mechanisms 
existed to adequately prosecute contractors for criminal actions while working abroad. See infra 
Part III. MEJA seems like a logical statutory choice for charging contractors for their criminal 
behavior, but it has several notable limitations. For one, it contains no procedural framework for 
the investigation and prosecution of alleged misconduct by contractors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3261–
3267 (2006). Moreover, its jurisdictional reach is short: for proscribed conduct to match the 
statute‘s requirements, the offense had to have occurred ―within the special maritime and 
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Congress proposed H.R. 2740 at a time when the United States 
had between 20,000 and 30,000 PMF contractors in Iraq alone.
15
 The 
number is astonishing considering that, at the end of the Cold War, 
PMFs in their modern corporate form were just beginning to emerge 
in large numbers.
16
 This widespread use of private contractors 
 
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.‖ Id. § 3261(a). See also 153 CONG. REC. H11,214-
26 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2007). Third, MEJA applied to contractors employed by the Department of 
Defense, but not all contractors working for the United States government have been contracted 
by that department. See 153 CONG. REC. H11,214 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Conyers) (―MEJA currently only extends U.S. Federal criminal jurisdiction to felony crimes 
committed overseas by contractors working on behalf of the Defense Department.‖). Finally, 
PMFs are a relatively new phenomenon with troubling analogous predecessors. See P. W. 
Singer, Outsourcing War, 84 FOREIGN AFF. 119, 120 (2005) (describing PMFs as the 
―corporate evolution‖ of mercenaries). The demand for privatized military and security options 
in international zones of conflict has grown since the end of the Cold War. See E. L. Gaston, 
Note, Mercenarism 2.0? The Rise of the Modern Private Security Industry and its Implications 
for International Humanitarian Law Enforcement, 49 HARV. INT‘L L.J. 221, 224 (2008). In 
light of these issues, a clearer, more definite structure for legal accountability is needed. 
 15. Gaston, supra note 14, at 223 (estimating there are between 20,000 and 30,000 private 
contractors in Iraq and 10,000 in Afghanistan). See also James Glanz, Report on Iraq Security 
Lists 310 Contracts, from U.S. to Uganda, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 29, 2008, at A5. 
 16. See Winston P. Nagan & Craig Hammer, The Rise of Outsourcing in Modern 
Warfare: Sovereign Power, Private Military Actors, and the Constitutive Process, 60 ME. L. 
REV. 429, 435–36 (2008). Indeed, the very idea of ―private military firms‖ has raised eyebrows. 
See P. W. SINGER, CORPORATE WARRIORS: THE RISE OF THE PRIVATIZED MILITARY 
INDUSTRY 216–21 (2003); Christopher J. Mandernach, Warriors without Law: Embracing a 
Spectrum of Status for Military Actors, 7 APPALACHIAN J.L. 137, 154 (2007); Jon D. Michaels, 
Beyond Accountability: The Constitutional, Democratic, and Strategic Problems with 
Privatizing War, 82 WASH. U. L.Q. 1001 (2004); Michael J. Trebilcock & Edward M. 
Iacobucci, Privatization and Accountability, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1422, 1444 (2003); Tyler 
Cowan, To Know Contractors, Know Government, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2007, at BU6. The 
provision of security through the use of violence in war typically had been monopolized by the 
state since the start of the twentieth century. SINGER, supra, at 17–18. But private military firms 
have been involved in scores of high risk and, at times, deadly military missions since the early 
1990s. Id. at 3–6, 10–11. Indeed, states themselves have been a major source of work for 
private military firms. See, e.g., id. at 15 (noting that between 1994 and 2002 the Department of 
Defense entered into more than 3,000 contracts with PMFs worth more than $300 billion). 
 This release of monopolized state violence makes private military firms extraordinary 
phenomena with important consequences for warfare in the twenty-first century. Furthermore, 
the lack of specific American legislation to hold contractors accountable for their criminal 
behavior can be attributed partly to the rapid rise in influence of PMFs. Current legislation that 
could prosecute employees of PMFs, however, has not been widely used. See infra note 117 
and accompanying text; see also Kateryna L. Rakowsky, Note, Military Contractors and Civil 
Liability: Use of the Government Contractor Defense to Escape Allegations of Misconduct in 
Iraq and Afghanistan, 2 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 365, 374–75 (2006); Editorial, Prosecuting 
Blackwater, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 16, 2007, at A32 (noting that ―not one contractor has been 
prosecuted for crimes against an Iraqi‖). 
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requires an examination of their origin and an understanding of their 
work with the United States and other countries. Accordingly, the 
history of PMFs is discussed in Part I of this Note. Part II explores 
the controversial nature of PMFs and the consequences of inadequate 
regulation of the industry.
17
 Part III discusses court cases addressing 
civilian criminal liability abroad. It examines statutes that attempt, 
rather unsuccessfully, to regulate contractors while they accompany 
our Armed Forces. An exploration of the narrow reach of the current 
law in Part IV, however, will highlight the goals of H.R. 2740, 
explain the necessity of revisiting the bill,
18
 and propose changes that 
will make the law governing private contractors‘ overseas behavior 
more comprehensive and effective.
19
  
 
 17. While the September 16 Blackwater shootings in Baghdad precipitated a demand for 
discipline and regulation, the episode was one of several that underscore the need for more 
definite legal accountability. Alleged human rights abuses by PMF employees in Bosnia and 
Iraq are discussed in Part II of this Note. See infra notes 78–82 and accompanying text. 
 18. While H.R. 2740 passed by a large margin in the House, it stalled in the Senate after 
being placed on the calendar. History of Bills Online: H.R. 2740, http://frwebgate6.access.gpo. 
gov/cgi-bin/TEXTgate.cgi?WAISdocID=782256499719+0+1+0&WAISaction=retrieve (last 
visited Apr. 19, 2010). Even if the Senate had passed the bill, the Bush administration publicly 
expressed its opposition to it. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE 
PRESIDENT, STATEMENT OF ADMINISTRATION POLICY: H.R. 2740—MEJA EXPANSION AND 
ENFORCEMENT ACT OF 2007 (2007). The Bush administration‘s position highlights several 
defects in H.R. 2740 as passed by the House. See id. Since a new administration is now in the 
White House, the issue of criminal liability for PMF employees may receive new attention, and 
H.R. 2740 may serve as a model for any future legislation that attempts to tackle the liability 
problem.  
 Meanwhile, PMFs continue to receive billions of dollars in contracts from the United States 
in the Middle East. See Bill Buzenberg, Windfalls of War II: Baghdad Bonanza, http://projects. 
publicintegrity.org/WOWII/default.aspx (last visited Apr. 19, 2010) (monitoring the top 100 
highest-paid PMFs in Iraq and Afghanistan and the amount of money their contracts are worth); 
see also John M. Broder & David Rohde, State Dept. Use of Contractors Leaps in 4 Years, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2007, at A1. Future scandals similar to the September 16 shootings are 
still a risk, particularly given the lack of oversight of contractor behavior by the government. 
See Broder & Rohde, supra at A1 (noting that State Department supervision of contractors has 
not kept up with the pace at which contracts are awarded). Were another major altercation to 
occur, it is likely that a bill similar to H.R. 2740 would move through Congress and reach the 
President quickly. 
 The United States terminated its security relationship with Blackwater in early 2009 when 
Iraq refused to renew Blackwater‘s operating license. Rod Nordland, After Blackwater Loses 
Security Deal, Many Ex-Workers Will Return to Iraq Jobs, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 4, 2009, at A4. 
However, the United States filled the security gap by contracting with the PMF Triple Canopy. 
Id. Many of the guards at Triple Canopy previously worked for Blackwater. Id.  
 19. Changes are necessary to prosecute crimes properly and to enhance the United States‘ 
reputation in a region where a good reputation is of strategic importance.  
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I. THE HISTORY OF PRIVATE MILITARY FIRMS  
Mercenaries are, in many ways, the forerunners of modern 
PMFs.
20
 PMFs resemble mercenaries in that both the modern PMF 
employee and the classic mercenary profit from conflict.
21
 Some 
scholars characterize PMFs as mercenaries of old,
22
 but PMFs are 
notably different for their diverse, globalized, and corporate 
structure.
23
 Accordingly, PMFs are able to offer a variety of services, 
and the industry is recognized for its specialization.
24
 In particular, 
 
 20. SINGER, supra note 16, at 45 (describing PMFs as the ―next evolution in the provision 
of military services by private actors‖). See also id. at 13–39 (detailing the history of the private 
military market). 
 21. However, while both PMFs and mercenaries are profit-driven, mercenaries operate in 
less-structured environments without formal employment contracts and, as a result, tend only to 
trust cash payments. See SINGER, supra note 16, at 42–46. PMFs, on the other hand, are 
corporate entities that utilize formal hierarchies and contract law, so employees are less 
concerned about whether they will be paid. See id.  
 22. See, e.g., Montgomery Sapone, Have Rifle with Scope, Will Travel: The Global 
Economy of Mercenary Violence, 30 CAL. W. INT‘L L.J. 1 (1999) (arguing that PMFs are 
simply modern mercenaries and should be illegal).  
 23. See SINGER, supra note 16, at 44–48; Gaston, supra note 14, at 228. PMFs draft 
contracts and negotiate within the boundaries of modern finance. SINGER, supra note 16, at 46. 
Employees operate within hierarchical, formalized business structures where directors and 
managers are stockholders in the company. Id. at 45. Further, PMFs compete on the global 
market, and they ―are diversified enough to work for multiple (and a wider variety of) clients, in 
multiple theatres at once.‖ Id. at 46. Additionally, PMFs are visible businesses, running 
websites and advertising to the public. Id. Mercenaries, on the other hand, operate outside the 
reach of the open, competitive world of structured business. Id.  
 24. See id. at 88–95 (discussing different types of military actors and their areas of 
expertise). It is important to distinguish contractors like Kellog, Brown & Root, which provides 
mainly support services to military clients, from contractors like DynCorp, which offers 
security and strategic defense services. See Rakowsky, supra note 16, at 369–70 (distinguishing 
the roles of military support firms and military provider firms). Of the many different types of 
contractors hired by the United States in the Middle East, all likely would fall within the 
definition of contractor proposed by H.R. 2740. See MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 
2007, H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. § 4 (2007). It reads: ―The term ‗contractor‘ means an entity 
performing a covered contract.‖ H.R. 2740 § 4(4). Covered contracts include any ―prime 
contract awarded by an agency,‖ any subcontract awarded under a prime contract, or any ―task 
order issued under a task or delivery order contract‖ where the work awarded is to be performed 
outside the United States and in a region where the ―Armed Forces are conducting a 
contingency operation.‖ H.R. 2740 § 4(1). 
 Cities began the privatization trend by awarding contracts for sanitation work, and 
eventually privatization spread to encompass other traditional government services. Michaels, 
supra note 16, at 1004. The privatization of such services now seems rather conventional, and 
efficiency serves as the main argument for maintaining a privatized system. Id. at 1007. 
Likewise, ―contracts to rebuild roads and schools in failed states and to manufacture new 
weapons do not compel us to rethink our basic understandings of American privatization.‖ Id. 
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firms ―specialize in the provision of military skills, including combat 
operations, strategic planning, intelligence, risk assessment, 
operational support, training, and technical skills.‖25  
PMFs are divided into three major categories: military provider 
firms, military support firms, and military consulting firms.
26
 
Provider firms ―are defined by their focus on the tactical 
environment.‖27 They carry out highly coordinated battlefield 
maneuvers, utilizing weaponry and vehicles to assist in or accomplish 
military objectives.
28
 Support firms, however, provide 
―supplementary military services,‖ such as ―nonlethal aid and 
assistance, including logistics, intelligence, technical support, supply, 
and transportation.‖29 Consulting firms typically train and advise 
countries‘ burgeoning police and military forces in the use of 
weapons and tactics.
30
 
The number of PMF contractors working in Iraq and Afghanistan 
has increased significantly in recent years.
31
 While PMFs did not 
 
H.R. 2740 is not directed at these mainstays of military assistance; it is targeted at contractors 
like Blackwater and MPRI that deal in the business of violence. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-352, at 
3–5 (2007). 
 25. SINGER, supra note 16, at 8. 
 26. Id. at 91. 
 27. Id. at 92. 
 28. See id. at 92–95. Military provider firms are likely to engage adversaries, with firms 
such as Executive Outcomes, SCI, and NFD having directed ―active combat operations‖ in 
several countries. Id. at 93. It is also probable that support firms and consulting firms, which are 
less directly tied to the battlefield, will use force by virtue of their close proximity to danger. 
Richard Morgan, Professional Military Firms under International Law, 9 CHI. J. INT‘L L. 213, 
216 (2008). See also SINGER, supra note 16, at 97. 
 29. See SINGER, supra note 16, at 97. Examples of support firms include Boeing Services 
and Holmes. Id. at 98. Generally, support firms ―are more like traditional multinational 
corporations‖ that have expanded over the years to provide services to the military market. Id. 
at 97–98. 
 30. Id. at 95–97. Consulting work is typically more profitable and often involves longer 
contract terms than other types of private military services. Id. at 96.  
 31. As of 2006, there were only about 30,000 to 40,000 contractors in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. See supra note 15 and accompanying text. However, by 2009 that number was 
much higher, even though a new administration is in charge:  
Right now there are 250 thousand contractors fighting the wars in Iraq and 
Afghanistan. That‘s about 50 percent of the total US fighting force. Which is very 
similar to what it was under Bush. In Iraq, President Obama has 130 thousand 
contractors. And we just saw a 23 percent increase in the number of armed contractors 
in Iraq. In Afghanistan there‘s been a 29 percent increase in armed contractors. So the 
radical privatization of war continues unabated under Barack Obama. 
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appear overnight, their popularity rose rapidly and largely as a result 
of political and economic forces unleashed at the end of the Cold 
War.  
The collapse of the Soviet Union shattered the balance of 
geopolitical power previously divided between the Soviet Union and 
the United States.
32
 During the Cold War, that balance kept relative 
order in areas across the globe, from the Balkans to Africa.
33
 Before 
the end of the Cold War, the United States and the Soviet Union used 
their power to maintain order throughout the world, encouraging 
―stability and strictly controll[ing] trouble spots.‖34 When the two 
superpowers shrank to one, countries formerly under scrutiny were 
left to form new governments and establish order for themselves.
35
 
Many countries relied on the support of the superpowers and, without 
it, suffered from weak public institutions, a shortage of money, and 
poor governance.
36
 The resulting easy access to abandoned weapon 
stockpiles meant nearly anyone could buy them.
37
 Scrambles for 
power ensued; conflicts and lawlessness reigned.
38
 Not surprisingly, 
the ―incidence of civil wars ha[s] doubled‖ since the end of the Cold 
War.
39
  
After the Cold War, the United States cut its staff of army 
personnel nearly in half, and the active military shrank by 500,000 
troops.
40
 Additionally, the United States became hesitant to entangle 
 
Bill Moyers Journal on PBS: The Rise of Private Armies—Mercenaries, Murder and 
Corruption in Iraq and Afghanistan (PBS television broadcast June 5, 2009) (statement of 
Jeremy Scahill) (transcript available at http://www.alternet.org/world/140526/bill_moyers:_ 
the_rise_of_private_armies_--_mercenaries,_murder_and_corruption_in_iraq_and_afghanistan/ 
?page=entire). 
 32. See SINGER, supra note 16, at 49; Singer, supra note 14, at 120; see also Michaels, 
supra note 16, at 1021 (discussing economic and political changes in the early 1990s that led to 
the rise of privatized military forces).  
 33. SINGER, supra note 16, at 50. See also Singer, supra note 14, at 120. 
 34. SINGER, supra note 16, at 49. 
 35. Id. at 50–51. 
 36. Id.  
 37. Id. at 50–54. 
 38. Id. at 50–51. 
 39. Id. at 50. 
 40. Michaels, supra note 16, at 1020 n.46. As of 2003, the number of soldiers in the 
United States military was one-third of what it was since the military peaked in size during the 
Cold War; the British army also reached historic lows. SINGER, supra note 16, at 53. Similar 
cuts occurred in other countries as well, particularly in the former Soviet Bloc. Id. This military 
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itself formally in foreign conflicts and civil wars in which it only 
needed to be indirectly involved.
41
 The world was becoming an 
increasingly volatile and dangerous place, and the United States 
government saw no reason to put American soldiers at risk if it could 
be avoided.
42
  
At the same time, global industry became more market-oriented 
and privatized.
43
 The collapse of the Soviet Union increased the 
number of capitalist countries.
44
 Meanwhile, in Great Britain and the 
United States, two countries with a long history of capitalism, the 
wave of privatization reached new heights.
45
 Under Margaret 
Thatcher‘s watch, Britain began denationalizing and privatizing state 
industries, a move that many other nations followed in an effort to 
revive their struggling economies.
46
 Keynesian economics,
47
 having 
dominated capitalist governments for decades, lost support in the late 
twentieth century, replaced by ―a belief in the superiority of the 
marketplace in fulfilling organizational or public needs.‖48  
These forces—scrambles for power after the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, military downsizing worldwide, reluctance by the West to 
entangle itself in foreign conflicts, and a wide ideological acceptance 
 
downsizing brought a flood of skilled ex-soldiers into the private market. Id. See also Gaston, 
supra note 14, at 224. 
 41. See SINGER, supra note 16, at 58. Further, the American public did not support 
sending troops to places like Somalia or the Balkans where there was no clear case for 
intervention but did support fighting in Afghanistan as necessary to national security. Id. at 50.  
 42. Id. at 58. 
 43. Id. at 66–67. 
 44. Id. at 67. ―As the Soviet bloc collapsed, nearly every state in it transitioned to a 
democratic regime and the accompanying market economy by privatizing its massive state 
industries.‖ Id. 
 45. Id. at 66–67. Prisons in the United States, for example, were considered an area that 
would not be privatized. Id. at 67. But prisons, along with other traditional government 
services, were privatized in the early 1990s. Id. Weaponry and defense technology also were 
privatized. Id. 
 46. Id. In 1995, Vice President Al Gore studied Thatcher‘s model and its successes to see 
if similar privatization could help the United States eliminate wasteful spending. Richard W. 
Stevenson, Britain Is Streamlining Its Bureaucracy, Partly by Privatizing Some Work, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 16, 1995, § 1, at 10. 
 47. British economist John Maynard Keynes influenced macroeconomic policy following 
the Great Depression by arguing that recessions and depressions will not likely correct 
themselves. CAMPBELL R. MCCONNELL & STANLEY L. BRUE, MACROECONOMICS: PRINCIPLES, 
PROBLEMS, AND POLICIES 188 (16th ed. 2005). Keynes ―argued that government should play an 
active role in stabilizing the economy.‖ Id.  
 48. SINGER, supra note 16, at 66. 
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of free markets—created an opening for PMFs to fill the global 
security gap.
49
 Actors outside what were essentially ―stateless zones‖ 
turned to privatized security options in hopes of regaining the Cold 
War-era stability.
50
 Their employees were highly skilled; many were 
decorated veterans of the most prestigious militaries in the world.
51
 
They possessed stocks of specialized weapons and knowledge of 
advanced combat techniques, and they were free to work for any 
group or government that needed military assistance.
52
 Indeed, by the 
end of the 1990s, the global PMF industry had participated in 
conflicts in Colombia, Eritrea, Mozambique, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and Papua New Guinea, among others.
53
  
Given the United States‘ reluctance in the aftermath of the Cold 
War to use American troops in foreign conflict zones, hiring PMFs 
provided an alternative to complete inaction. In fact, the United 
States has become the greatest procurer of private military services.
54
 
Between 1994 and 2002, ―the Defense Department entered into more 
than 3,000 contracts with U.S.-based firms, estimated at a contract 
value of more than $300 billion.‖55 And since the start of the wars in 
Afghanistan and Iraq, the United States has paid out more than $48.7 
billion in contracts.
56
  
PMF contractors have worked in numerous volatile and 
controversial combat zones. For example, the United States wanted 
some level of involvement in Colombia and other countries to clamp 
down on the drug trade, but Congress was not willing to spend the 
political or military capital to send American troops.
57
 As a result, the 
Clinton Administration spent more than $1.2 billion on private 
military contracts in an attempt to stop the flow of narcotics coming 
 
 49. SINGER, supra note 16, at 50–51. 
 50. Id. This was a time of great destabilization and reordering, as evidenced by the rise of 
―[t]ransnational criminals, economic insurgents, warlords for profit, armies of child soldiers . . . 
found in these zones of conflict and lawlessness.‖ Id. at 51.  
 51. See id. at 76. 
 52. See Zoe Salzman, Private Military Contractors and the Taint of a Mercenary 
Reputation, 40 N.Y.U. J. INT‘L L. & POL. 853, 863 (2008). 
 53. SINGER, supra note 16, at 10 fig.1.1 (map showing countries with confirmed PMF 
activity).  
 54. Id. at 15.  
 55. Id.  
 56. See Rakowsky, supra note 16, at 371. 
 57. See Michaels, supra note 16, at 1024. 
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into the United States.
58
 Croatia, struggling during the Balkan wars, 
hired MPRI, a PMF, for security assistance.
59
 MPRI provided 
extensive Western-style combat and strategy training to the Croat 
soldiers who had continually lost battles to the Serbs since the start of 
the war.
60
 After MPRI stepped in, the Croats launched a surprise 
counter-offensive against the Serbs, which constituted a major 
turning point.
61
 Within weeks, the war was over.
62
  
Since September 11, 2001, the United States‘ use of PMFs has 
continued to grow.
63
 As of 2006, more than sixty firms operated in 
Iraq, with more than 20,000 private contractors carrying out military 
services on the ground.
64
 Contractors have guarded military and 
government personnel,
65
 protected valuable buildings and 
installations, escorted convoys, and engaged in sieges and firefights.
66
 
Their numbers are at least equal to all the members in the United 
States‘ coalition partners combined.67  
 
 58. Id. at 1025. DynCorp and MPRI were the primary contracting corporations, and they 
provided extensive training and reconnaissance to the Colombian military. See SINGER, supra 
note 16, at 207–08. Contractors reportedly took on active combat roles and openly engaged 
Columbian insurgency groups. Id. at 208. 
 59. See SINGER, supra note 16, at 5. 
 60. See id. at 4–5. 
 61. Id. at 5. 
 62. Id. At the negotiating table, the Bosnian Muslims conditioned their agreement to the 
peace terms on receiving military assistance from the same group that was rumored to have 
given the Croats advice on carrying out their offensive. See id.  
 63. Singer, supra note 14, at 122. (―Not only is Iraq now the site of the single largest U.S. 
military commitment in more than a decade; it is also the marketplace for the largest 
deployment of PMFs and personnel ever.‖).  
 64. See Singer, supra note 14, at 122. 
 65. Michaels, supra note 16, at 1029. 
 66. See Daniel Bergner, The Other Army, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Aug. 14, 2005, at 33 
(describing defense operations and fighting in Najaf against the Mahdi Army). 
 67. Singer, supra note 14, at 122. There are many reasons for the large number of 
contractors. To some extent, continuing foreign operations depends on the support of the 
American public, and the public is averse to what it deems the unnecessary deaths of American 
soldiers. See generally SINGER, supra note 16, at 58 (discussing the growing unwillingness of 
outside powers to intervene in foreign conflicts and the factors that are weighed before 
intervention, including consideration of public support). Given that Armed Forces‘ casualties 
are closely monitored, controversy can be minimized by augmenting the military with large 
numbers of contractors because contractor deaths rarely are reported. See John M. Broder & 
James Risen, Death Toll for Contractors Reaches New High in Iraq, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 
2007, at A1 (noting that contractor deaths are ―largely hidden casualties of the war‖ with at 
least 917 killed and over 12,000 ―wounded in battle or injured on the job‖). There is a high 
demand for troops but the public opposes reinstituting the draft. See Eric Lichtblau, Flurry of 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_journal_law_policy/vol32/iss1/15
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2010]  PMFs and Accountability Gaps 499 
 
 
II. CONTROVERSY 
The legal accountability of PMFs generates great concern, a fact 
made apparent by H.R. 2740‘s calls for increased regulation of the 
industry.
68
 The Blackwater shooting in Nisour Square was not the 
first troubling incident involving PMFs. Several controversial aspects 
of PMF structure and behavior preceded—and arguably 
precipitated—the drafting of H.R. 2740. 
One area of particular concern involves the structure and purpose 
of PMFs.
69
 Above all, they are businesses that strive to make profits. 
Because their services are only useful during conflict, they arguably 
profit from conflict.
70
 This is an unsettling idea, and ―the firms often 
provoke a quite hostile reaction and have been viciously attacked in 
the public arena.‖71  
The disconcerting notion of soldiers with a profit motive ties into 
the idea that the state should have a monopoly over the use of 
formalized violence. In modern society, security is an essential 
government function that citizens expect in return for their 
membership in society.
72
 Membership in a formalized, government-
run society is conditioned in many ways upon the guarantee of 
 
Calls about Draft, and a Day of Denials, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2006, at A14 (describing the 
public panic after a news agency reported the Selective Service was preparing for a ―mock‖ 
draft). Drafts should be avoided, and hiring PMFs is a logical step to take to avoid a draft. 
Steven Levitt explains that drafts are inefficient because they force otherwise uninterested 
people to serve in the military even though many of those people have other unrelated 
productive and marketable skills. See Posting of Steven Levitt to Freakonomics: The Hidden 
Side of Everything, http://freakonomics.blogs.nytimes.com/2007/08/14/restore-the-draft-what-
a-bad-idea/?scp=2-b&sq=iraq+draft&st=nyt (Aug. 14, 2007, 09:39 EST). 
 68. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-352, at 3–5 (2007). During discussion of the bill, 
Representative John Conyers of Michigan, referring to the Sept. 16th shooting, noted, ―This 
latest incident unfortunately evidences the fact that some of these contractors are abusing their 
power with impunity, subject to no law whatsoever, domestic or foreign.‖ 153 CONG. REC. 
H11,214 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2007) (statement of Rep. Conyers). 
 69. Peter Singer describes the prominent ideological objection to PMFs thusly: there 
exists a ―general feeling . . . that those who carry out [the U.S. government‘s] core missions 
should be responsible to the public and not other entities.‖ SINGER, supra note 16, at 226. 
Singer argues that ―[w]hen the government delegates out part of its role in national security 
through the recruitment and maintenance of armed forces, it is abdicating an essential 
responsibility.‖ Id.  
 70. Id. at 216.  
 71. Id. at 217. 
 72. See id. at 6–8; see also id. at 226.  
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safety.
73
 By contracting out this core function, the government risks 
both its legitimacy and the loyalty of its citizens.
74
 
Serious ethical questions are raised when PMFs enter into 
business relationships that allow them to profit from conflict.
75
 PMFs, 
unlike the military, are not obligated to act in their home 
government‘s interest.76 While a PMF may contract with a friendly 
state, it is free to work with any group no matter the moral or 
strategic ramifications. The demands of a competitive market should 
create a disincentive to work for an unpalatable government or 
organization. PMFs, however, operate, to some degree, outside of 
regular market forces and with inadequate oversight.
77
 Government 
actors behave as irrational consumers, hiring PMFs despite serious 
allegations of abuse of power. During the Balkan Wars, the United 
States contracted with DynCorp, an American PMF, to assist the 
U.N. Police Task Force in Bosnia.
78
 Reports emerged that DynCorp 
employees were buying and trading young women and girls. On June 
2, 2000, U.S. military police raided Dyncorp‘s facilities, and the U.S. 
Army confirmed several of the allegations.
79
 The information was 
turned over to the Bosnian police, but none of the people involved 
were charged criminally.
80
 Despite the incident, DynCorp currently 
operates as a government-contracted PMF in Iraq.
81
 PMFs also 
 
 73. See id. at 226–27. 
 74. See id. at 226. 
 75. PMFs have been criticized for working with any side of a conflict, no matter the moral 
dimensions. ―Some firms have gone to work for non-state conflict groups, helping them in their 
quest to gain greater military capabilities. . . . Their state opponents, in turn, have also hired 
PMFs.‖ Id. at 52. PMFs reportedly have worked for rebel groups in countries such as Namibia 
and Burundi. Id. at 11. Similarly, during the Democratic Republic of Congo‘s civil war, several 
warring rebel factions employed PMFs against one another. Id. at 10–11. 
 76. Michaels, supra note 16, at 1089–91. See also id. at 1085–88.  
 77. See Rakowsky, supra note 16, at 377 (describing how basic market forces like supply 
and demand are ignored in the private military market because governments behave like 
irrational consumers with a high demand and thus ignore the quality of the supply); see also 
Steven L. Schooner, Contractor Atrocities at Abu Ghraib: Compromised Accountability in a 
Streamlined, Outsourced Government, 16 STAN. L. & POL‘Y REV. 549 (2005).  
 78. Gaston, supra note 14, at 229. 
 79. See Robert Capps, Outside the Law, SALON.COM, June 26, 2002, http://dir.salon.com/ 
story/news/feature/2002/06/26/bosnia/index.html. 
 80. Id. 
 81. Press Release, DynCorp International, Dyncorp International Wins $99 Million 
Contract to Send Advisors to Iraq (Nov. 8, 2008), http://www.dyn-intl.com/news2008/ 
news110508.aspx (last visited Oct. 26, 2009).  
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reportedly were involved in the torture scandal at Abu Ghraib prison 
in 2004, but none involved were disciplined.
82
 Even with serious 
allegations directed at PMF employees, the United States still 
employs private contractors overseas. 
III. CASES AND LAWS PERTAINING TO PMFS 
PMFs‘ accountability while working outside the United States is 
unclear. As a result, PMF employees often escape liability for 
criminal behavior. The Uniform Code of Military Justice (―UCMJ‖)83 
seemingly provided a framework under which contractors could have 
been held criminally liable while working for the United States 
abroad.
84
 The UCMJ has two components that appear to criminalize 
contractors‘ criminal conduct. First, Article 2(11) extends the 
jurisdiction of the Code to people serving or accompanying the 
Armed Forces overseas.
85
 Second, the Code described a system of 
court martial to try violators of its provisions.
86
 Thus, as enacted, the 
UCMJ appears to subject contractors to courts martial for the crimes 
they commit overseas.  
However, in Reid v. Covert,
87
 the Supreme Court rejected such a 
broad interpretation of the UCMJ.
88
 The Covert defendant was a 
civilian woman who murdered her husband, an Air Force sergeant, 
while they were living on a military airbase in England.
89
 After a trial 
by court martial, she was convicted of murder under Article 118 of 
the UCMJ.
90
 The Supreme Court reversed Mrs. Covert‘s conviction 
 
 82. Singer, supra note 14, at 127–28. Army investigators ―found that contractors were 
involved in 36 percent of the proven incidents and identified 6 employees [of Titan and CACI, 
two PMFs] as individually culpable.‖ Id. None were punished, and no outside inquiries into 
corporate culpability were conducted. Id. at 128. 
 83. 10 U.S.C. §§ 801–946 (2006).  
 84. See 10 U.S.C. § 802(11).  
 85. By its terms, the UCMJ applies to ―persons serving with, employed by, or 
accompanying the armed forces outside the United States. . . .‖ 10 U.S.C. § 802(11). 
Contractors who work alongside the United States military abroad appear to fall within the 
UCMJ‘s reach. 
 86. See §§ 816–876 for the full statutory framework that governs courts martial. 
 87. 354 U.S. 1 (1957).  
 88. Id. at 5–6. 
 89. Id. at 3. 
 90. Id. at 3–4. Defense counsel unsuccessfully argued that Mrs. Covert was not guilty by 
reason of insanity. Id. at 4. 
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and held that courts martial are not an appropriate forum for trying 
civilians who accompany the Armed Forces overseas in times of 
peace.
91
 The plurality opinion called it unconstitutional to hold trials 
by court martial under such circumstances. Concurring, Justice 
Harlan recommended limiting the Court‘s decision to capital 
crimes.
92
 Three years later, in Kinsella v. United States ex rel. 
Singleton,
93
 the Court explicitly rejected the notion that a civilian 
could face a trial by court martial for a non-capital offense.
94
 
In 1970, the Court of Military Appeals considered in United States 
v. Averette whether the UCMJ should apply to civilians.
95
 Raymond 
Averette, a civilian employee of an Army contractor in Vietnam, was 
 
 91. Id. at 40–41 (―And under our Constitution courts of law alone are given the power to 
try civilians for their offenses against the United States.‖).  
 92. ―We hold that . . . Mrs. Covert . . . [can]not constitutionally be tried by military 
authorities.‖ Id. at 5. The Court used sweeping language to acknowledge the significance of the 
issue before it: ―These cases raise basic constitutional issues of the utmost concern. They call 
into question the role of the military under our system of government.‖ Id. at 3. The plurality 
further emphasized that the Constitution, particularly the Bill of Rights, protects American 
citizens even if they ―happen[] to be in another land.‖ Id. at 5–6. In his concurrence, Justice 
Harlan suggested narrower grounds were more appropriate given the cases before the Court. Id. 
at 77–78 (Harlan, J., concurring). Comparing capital offenses to the crime of treason, which 
must be tried in courts of law, Justice Harlan opined: 
I see no reason for not applying the same principle to any case where a civilian 
dependent stands trial on pain of life itself. The number of such cases would appear to 
be so negligible that the practical problem of affording the defendant a civilian trial 
would not present insuperable problems. 
Id. He saw no reason to consider non-capital offenses but joined the plurality in reversing the 
convictions. Id. 
 93. 361 U.S. 234 (1960).  
 94. Ms. Dial, the wife of a soldier, was tried by a United States court martial in Germany 
for the unpremeditated murder of her child. Id. at 235–36. She and her husband were charged 
under Article 118(2) of the UCMJ, and both pleaded guilty before the court martial. Id. After 
conviction and transfer to the United States, Dial filed a petition for habeas corpus, claiming 
that she could only be tried in a trial court that afforded her Fifth and Sixth Amendment 
protections. Id. The Court held that her conviction was unconstitutional and called capital and 
noncapital offenses ―so intertwined that equal treatment . . . would be a palliative to a troubled 
world.‖ Id. at 249.  
 The Court‘s decisions that prevented civilians from being subject to courts martial 
stemmed from crimes that occurred during times of peace or, at least, during times when war 
was not formally declared. Similarly, in Iraq and Afghanistan Congress authorized the 
government to use force but stopped short of declaring war. See generally War Powers 
Resolution, 50 U.S.C. § 1541 (2006) (containing the Authorization for Use of Military Force in 
Iraq Resolution of 2002 and the Authorization for Use of Military Force Against September 11 
Terrorists).  
 95. United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363 (1970).  
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convicted by a court martial of conspiracy to commit larceny and 
attempted larceny.
96
 The court held that the UCMJ applies only when 
there is a declared war, which the Vietnam War was not, so Averette 
was not triable by court martial.
97
 After Reid, Kinsella, and Averette, 
the UCMJ was mostly ineffective at holding civilians criminally 
liable while accompanying the Armed Forces overseas.  
Congress repeatedly attempted to address the lack of contractor 
liability, but the sporadic and limited nature of its attempts created 
the impetus for H.R. 2740.
98
 In 2000, Congress passed the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act (―MEJA‖).99 MEJA extended 
jurisdiction to those ―employed by or accompanying the Armed 
Forces outside the United States.‖100 However, as passed in 2000, 
MEJA reached only contractors employed by the Department of 
Defense
101
 and, therefore, stopped short of comprehensively 
addressing contractor liability issues. 
 
 96. Id. at 363. 
 97. Id. at 365. ―We conclude that the words ‗in time of war‘ mean, for the purposes of 
Article 2(10), . . . a war formally declared by Congress.‖ Id.  
 98. In the House debates leading up to the passage of H.R. 2740, Congresswoman Sutton 
of Ohio remarked that the existing legislation was insufficient: ―At present, the Military 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act, MEJA, leaves felonies committed by contractors working for 
other Federal Departments [than the Department of Defense] unpunished. This is unfair and 
unacceptable, and this Congress must act to ensure that justice is not a selective American 
principle.‖ 153 CONG. REC. H11,178 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2007) (statement of Rep. Sutton).  
 99. Pub. L. No. 106-523, 114 Stat. 2488 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267 
(2006)).  
 100. 18 U.S.C. § 3261(a) (2006). When Congress amended MEJA in 2004, see infra note 
105 and accompanying text, the language of section 3261(a) did not change. See Pub. L. No. 
108-375, 118 Stat. 1811, 2066–67 (2004) (amending only the definition of ―employed as‖ under 
MEJA section 3267(1)(A)). Section 3261 states in full:  
(a) Whoever engages in conduct outside the United States that would constitute an 
offense punishable by imprisonment for more than one year if the conduct had been 
engaged in within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United 
States— 
 (1) while employed by or accompanying the Armed Forces outside the United 
States; or 
 (2) while a member of the Armed Forces subject to chapter 47 of title 10 (the 
Uniform Code of Military Justice), shall be punished as provided for that offense. 
§ 3261(a). 
 101. See § 3267(1), 114 Stat. at 2491. 
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The USA PATRIOT Act,
102
 passed eleven months later, extended 
the United States‘ criminal jurisdiction to ―the premises of United 
States diplomatic, consular, military or other United States 
Government missions or entities in foreign States, including the 
buildings, parts of buildings, and land appurtenant or ancillary thereto 
. . . .‖103 Even this jurisdictional extension is restrictive and, as of 
2006, had been used only once to charge an overseas contractor with 
a crime.
104
 
In 2004, Congress amended MEJA and extended the statute‘s 
jurisdictional reach.
105
 Even as amended, MEJA still may not 
comprehensively subject contractors to American criminal law, as it 
remains unclear whether it applies to contractors not employed by the 
Department of Defense.
106
 Further, MEJA fails to mandate oversight 
 
 102. Uniting and Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to 
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (―USA PATRIOT‖) Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-56, 115 
Stat. 272 (codified in scattered sections). 
 
 103. 18 U.S.C. § 7(9)(A) (2006).  
 104. The PATRIOT Act‘s extension of criminal jurisdiction was used to prosecute David 
Passaro, a contractor working for the CIA in Afghanistan. Rakowsky, supra note 16, at 374–75. 
Passaro was charged with assault under the Act for allegedly torturing a detainee. Id. 
 105. See Pub. L. 108–375, § 1088, 118 Stat. 1811, 2066–67 (2004) (codified as amended at 
18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267 (2006)).  
 106. It is unclear whether MEJA applies to contractors employed by other federal agencies. 
The definition of ―employed by the Armed Forces outside the United States‖ includes a 
contractor of the Department of Defense or ―any other Federal agency, or any provisional 
authority, to the extent such employment relates to supporting the mission of the Department of 
Defense overseas.‖ 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (2006). This language certainly suggests that even a 
PMF employed by the State Department could be subject to liability under MEJA if the PMF‘s 
employment related to supporting a Department of Defense mission overseas. However, 
lawmakers, prosecutors, and legal commentators disagree as to MEJA‘s reach.  
 In congressional debates, Representative Betty Sutton of Ohio noted that, ―under current 
law, only contractors working for the Department of Defense can be held responsible for crimes 
they commit while working in Iraq, Afghanistan and elsewhere throughout the world.‖ 153 
CONG. REC. H11,178 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2007) (statement of Rep. Sutton). Eugene Fidell, 
President of the National Institute of Military Justice and a lecturer at Yale Law School, also 
does not ―think that the Blackwater people who are involved in the Nasur [sic] square incident 
fall within MEJA.‖ Daphne Eviatar, Are Iraq Contractors Subject to U.S. Law? WASH. INDEP., 
Dec. 26, 2008, http://washingtonindependent.com/23037/are-iraq-contractors-subject-to-us-law. 
Conversely, the Department of Justice characterizes the indicted PMF employees as 
―employees and subcontractors of Blackwater Worldwide, a company contracting with the 
United States Department of State . . . [whose] employment related to supporting the mission of 
the United States Department of Defense in the Republic of Iraq.‖ Indictment at 2, United 
States v. Slough, No. CR-08-360 (D.C. Dec. 4, 2008). Because the prosecution ―is the first 
under the Military Extraterritorial Jurisdiction Act to be filed against non-Defense Department 
private contractors,‖ the issue of whether MEJA currently reaches them remains undecided. 
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and enforcement.
107
 Thus, while MEJA does, in theory, expose more 
contractors to criminal liability, it does not explain how, or by whom, 
violators should be brought to justice. 
In 2006, Congress amended the UCMJ to extend jurisdiction ―[i]n 
time of a declared war or a contingency operation, [to] persons 
serving with or accompanying an armed force in the field.‖108 The 
notable change was the addition of the language, ―contingency 
operation.‖ This amendment could serve to counter the decisions in 
Reid, Kinsella, and Averette.
109
 More importantly, the UCMJ 
amendment may have repercussions for contractors, as they now 
appear to be subject to court martial for criminal actions committed 
during contingency operations abroad.
110
 
Secretary of Defense Robert Gates tried to clarify the meaning of 
the amendment in March 2008 by issuing a memo outlining the 
 
Mike Scarcella, Blackwater Lawyers Seek Military Guard to Visit Crime Scene, NAT‘L L.J., 
Oct. 26, 2009, at 4, available at http://www.law.com/jsp/nlj/PubArticleNLJ.jsp?id=1202434 
897650&slreturn=1&hbxlogin=1. 
 107. Compare 18 U.S.C. §§ 3261–3267 (2006) (detailing arrest and judicial proceedings 
but not mandating oversight or investigation), with MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 
2007, H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. (2007) (detailing enforcement procedures for the FBI and the 
Attorney General and requiring the Department of Justice to submit a progress report to 
Congress).  
 108. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2006). 
 109. See supra notes 86–97 and accompanying text. There is no mention of contingency 
operations in any of these three cases. See Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Singleton, 361 U.S. 
234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); United States v. Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363 
(1970). What effect, if any, the addition of ―contingency operations‖ could have is unknown. 
Interestingly, Averette was unable to be charged because his actions took place during an 
undeclared war. See Averette, 41 C.M.R. 363. The UCMJ defines a ―contingency operation‖ as 
one involving the military and ―designated by the Secretary of Defense as an operation in which 
members of the armed forces are or may become involved . . . against an enemy of the United 
States. . . .‖ 10 U.S.C. § 101(13)(A) (2006). One could argue that Vietnam was a contingency 
operation. If it were, Averette might have been liable under the amended UCMJ. 
 110. It is unclear, however, whether Iraq and Afghanistan are contingency operations. In 
the Justice Department‘s indictment against the five Blackwater guards for the September 2007 
shooting, there is no mention of Iraq being a contingency operation. See Indictment, supra note 
115. The Department bypassed this new provision altogether, choosing to base jurisdiction 
upon MEJA. Id. at 1–2. However, Defense Secretary Gates drafted a memorandum, discussed 
infra note 111, which refers to Department of Defense (―DoD‖) civilian employees and DoD 
contractors working alongside the military in contingency operations as part of the Global War 
on Terror. Indeed, the memorandum assumes that civilians and contractors are now subject to 
the UCMJ. See infra note 111. Although neither Iraq nor Afghanistan is mentioned in the 
document, presumably they are the main theatres in the Global War on Terror and thus may 
constitute contingency operations. 
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necessary procedures for bringing civilians who accompany the 
armed forces before courts martial.
111
 The memo and the UCMJ 
amendment, however, use different language when describing which 
civilians are subject to court martial.
112
 Moreover, the clause ―person 
serving with or accompanying the armed force‖ in a contingency 
operation under the 2006 UCMJ amendment is subject to the 
additional qualification that the armed force is one ―in the field.‖113 
Interpreting ―in the field‖ presents an additional complication in 
determining the meaning of the amendment.
114
  
This patchwork of laws—MEJA, the PATRIOT Act, and 10 
U.S.C. § 802(a)(10)—currently serves as the tool by which the 
United States can criminally prosecute a civilian contractor working 
overseas.
115
 In Iraq, the laws have been the only tools. Order 17 of the 
 
 111. Secretary Gates explained that criminal infractions by employees of the Department of 
Defense or by civilians accompanying the armed forces shall be reported to the Department of 
Justice; if the Department of Justice will not proceed with prosecution, certain military 
commanders with the proper authority can, with exception, refer the civilian to a court martial. 
See Memorandum from Secretary of Defense Robert Gates for Secretaries of the Military 
Departments, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Under Secretaries of Defense, and 
Commanders of the Combatant Commands, (Mar. 10, 2008), http://www.fas.org/sgp/othergov/ 
dod/gates-ucmj.pdf [hereinafter Gates Memorandum]; see also Morgan, supra note 28, at 230–
31 (discussing the Gates memorandum‘s procedures). 
 112. The Gates memorandum appears to assume that only Department of Defense civilian 
employees and contractors would be liable under the UCMJ. See Gates Memorandum, supra 
note 111, at 2 (―There is a particular need for clarity regarding the legal framework that should 
govern a command response to any illegal activities by Department of Defense civilian 
employees and DoD contractor personnel overseas with our Armed Forces.‖). The 
memorandum speaks only of DoD contractors and civilians; it does not describe contractors or 
civilians in other departments. However, because the memorandum is from the Defense 
Secretary to parties affiliated with the Defense Department, the omission of non-DoD 
contractors and civilians may have been intentional. In any event, the UCMJ amendment uses 
briefer, wider-reaching language, describing ―persons‖ who accompany the Armed Forces in a 
declared war or contingency operation as being subject to the UCMJ. See 10 U.S.C. 
§ 802(a)(10) (2006).  
 113. 10 U.S.C. § 802(a)(10) (2006). 
 114. Illuminating this additional interpretative complication demonstrates the need for a 
comprehensive statute addressing overseas contractors like H.R. 2740. 
 115. Even with several laws addressing civilian liability for crimes committed abroad, few 
prosecutions actually succeed. In fact, as of October 2009, David Passaro was the ―only civilian 
tried and convicted‖ of detainee abuse since the Iraq and Afghanistan wars began. No Safe 
Haven: Accountability for Human Rights Violators, Part II, Hearing before the Subcomm. on 
Human Rights and the Law of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. 5 (2009) (Statement 
of Lanny A. Breuer, Assistant Attorney General, Department of Justice Criminal Division). 
However, the Justice Department, responding to public and congressional outcry after the 
September 2007 Blackwater shootings, charged five guards for their involvement in the 
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Provisional Coalition Authority has immunized contractors from 
Iraqi law.
116
 
The MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007 (H.R. 2740), 
passed by the House in October 2007, was an attempt to extend 
criminal culpability to all contractors employed under contracts with 
U.S. government agencies for infractions committed abroad.
117
 
Specifically, it was a response to the Blackwater shootings, but the 
House debates indicate that the Act‘s effects would have been far-
reaching.
118
 Without a coherent law to prosecute the criminal actions 
 
shootings. See Ginger Thompson & James Risen, 5 Guards Face U.S. Charges in Iraq Deaths, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 6, 2008, at A1. The Justice Department opted to use MEJA rather than the 
other applicable statutes to establish jurisdiction over the guards. Indictment at 2, United States 
v. Slough, No. CR-08-360 (D.C. Dec. 4, 2008). The indictment emphasizes that the five men 
engaged in criminal conduct outside the United States as subcontractors for Blackwater 
Worldwide, a Department of Defense contractor. Id. at 1–2. The men are charged with four 
violations: voluntary manslaughter; attempt to commit manslaughter; using and discharging a 
firearm during and in relation to a crime of violence; and aiding and abetting and causing an act 
to be done. Id. at 1. The defendants‘ attorneys allege that the charges are politically motivated 
and will be difficult to prove given the unique situation of occupying Iraq. Josh Meyer, Guards 
Defied Orders, U.S. Says, L.A. TIMES, Dec. 9, 2008, at A1.  
 116. See Coalition Provisional Authority Memorandum Order Number 17 (Revised), 
http://www.cpa-iraq.org/regulations/20040627_CPAORD_17_Status_of_Coalition__Rev__with_ 
Annex_A.pdf (last visited Nov. 15, 2009). Under the provisions of the Order ―[c]ontractors shall 
be immune from Iraqi legal process with respect to acts performed by them pursuant to the 
terms and conditions of a Contract or any sub-contract thereto.‖ Id. § 4(3). Additionally, the 
Order specifies: ―All MNF, CPA and Foreign Liaison Mission Personnel, and International 
Consultants shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of their Sending States. They shall be 
immune from any form of arrest or detention other than by persons acting on behalf of their 
Sending States. . . .‖ Id. § 2(3). However, contractors no longer are immune from Iraqi liability 
following the expiration of the U.N. Mandate in December 2008. See Walter Pincus, Fatal 
Shootings by Iraq Contractors Drop in 2008, WASH. POST, Dec. 20, 2008, at A9. Ideally, this 
will increase accountability for contractors in Iraq. 
 117. See H.R. REP. NO. 110-352, at 3 (2007). The need for comprehensive legislation, like 
H.R. 2740 is great given the inconsistent and unclear nature of the existing patchwork of 
jurisdictional statutes. See supra notes 98–114 and accompanying text. 
 118. See, e.g., 153 CONG. REC. 11,214–15 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2007) (statement of Rep. 
Conyers). Representative Conyers opined:  
First, it closes the legal gap in current law by making all contractors accountable for 
their actions. MEJA currently only extends U.S. Federal criminal jurisdiction to felony 
crimes committed overseas by contractors working on behalf of the Defense 
Department. . . . 
. . . . 
Second, this measure requires that the Inspector General of the Justice Department 
examine and report on the Department‘s efforts to investigate and prosecute 
allegations of misconduct committed by contractors overseas.  
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of contractors, Iraqis‘ opinion of the United States will continue to 
dwindle.
119
 Moreover, Representative Betty Sutton expressed grave 
concern that under current laws, contractors essentially are subject to 
no laws at all and are able to do whatever they like with no fear of 
repercussions.
120
 H.R. 2740, had it become law, would have 
addressed, and hopefully fixed, this accountability gap.
121
 
Furthermore, it proposed a systematic approach for the enforcement 
of American criminal laws by creating FBI criminal investigative 
units to address allegations of misconduct.
122
 The bill also articulated 
procedures for referring appropriate cases to the Attorney General 
and the Department of Justice for prosecution.
123
 
H.R. 2740 would have amended the language of MEJA section 
3261(a) and extended liability to persons ―employed under a contract 
(or subcontract at any tier) awarded by any department or agency of 
the United States . . . .‖124 Additionally, the bill aimed to specify 
MEJA‘s reach by subjecting contractors to liability for conduct 
committed in areas of contingency operations, like the 2006 UCMJ 
amendment.
125
 Adding the phrase ―contingency operation‖ keeps the 
statute from falling into the pitfall created by Reid and Averette, 
where contractors could not be brought under court martial if war 
were not declared.
126
 The bill also would have required the Inspector 
 
. . . . 
Third, H.R. 2740 establishes ground units of the Federal Bureau of Investigation to 
investigate allegations of criminal misconduct by contractors.  
Id. 
 119. The House debates reflect a desire to build trust and confidence among the Iraqi 
public. Representative Sutton expressed such a sentiment: ―The truth is, every time we see an 
incident with an Iraqi civilian being killed and American contractors escaping accountability, 
our men and women in uniform suffer. They see support from the insurgents rise and they lose 
the trust of the Iraqi people.‖ 153 CONG. REC. H11,181 (daily ed. Oct. 3, 2007) (statement of 
Rep. Sutton). 
 120. Id. at H11,178 (―Our current law has given private mercenary armies like Blackwater 
USA free rein to do as they please without fearing the repercussions.‖).  
 121. See id. (discussing how H.R. 2740 closes the accountability gap). 
 122. See H.R. 2740 § 3(a). 
 123. H.R. 2740 §§ 2(b), 3(b). 
 124. H.R. 2740 § 2(a)(3).  
 125. A contractor is liable ―where the work under such contract is carried out in an area, or 
in close proximity to an area (as designated by the Department of Defense), where the Armed 
Forces is conducting a contingency operation.‖ H.R. 2740 § 2(a)(3). 
 126. See supra notes 97, 109 and accompanying text. 
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General of the Department of Justice to submit a report to Congress 
within 180 days of the passage of the Act.
127
  
One of the important changes proposed by H.R. 2740 was its 
establishment of the FBI Theater Investigative Unit to conduct 
inquiries into allegations of criminal conduct.
128
 After conducting an 
investigation, the unit was to refer any information it gathered to the 
Attorney General, who would have discretion whether to pursue 
further action.
129
 Additionally, H.R. 2740 required the director of the 
FBI to make an annual report to Congress detailing the findings of 
the unit periodically.
130
 
IV. H.R. 2740: ROOM FOR IMPROVEMENT 
Effective legislation to ensure contractors are liable for their 
conduct while abroad is necessary.
131
 H.R. 2740‘s strength is its 
specificity in describing who is liable.
132
 The PATRIOT Act, MEJA, 
and section 802(a)(10) of the UCMJ are available to prosecutors, but 
the statutes lack clarity. Unlike the language limiting MEJA‘s current 
reach to contractors for any federal agency that acts to support the 
mission of the Defense Department,
133
 H.R. 2740 made it clear that 
contractors of any department working abroad to support any agency 
 
 127. The report would have detailed the number of complaints received by the Department; 
the number of investigations and criminal cases opened because of the complaints; and the 
number and result of criminal cases closed. H.R. 2740 § 2(b). Moreover, the bill stated that the 
report must contain descriptions of any charges brought against contractors and the legal action 
the Department of Justice pursued. Id.  
 128. The unit was intended to ―investigate reports that raise reasonable suspicion of 
criminal misconduct by contract personnel‖ and to ―investigate reports of fatalities resulting 
from the potentially unlawful use of force by contract personnel.‖ Id. § 3(b). 
 129. Id. § 3(b)(3). 
 130. Id. § 3(e). 
 131. Ideally, the new legislation will accomplish several things. First, its provisions should 
create a disincentive for future criminal behavior. Second, it should provide practical and 
implementable guidance to law enforcement agencies in the event of a crime. And third, it 
should act as a message to past victims of criminal PMF behavior and to allies of the United 
States that legal impunity for PMFs is not tolerated. Additionally, it should offer reparations to 
those directly affected by PMF abuse. 
 132. See MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. § 2 
(2007) (specifying that contractors employed by all departments or agencies of the United 
States are liable).  
 133. See 18 U.S.C. § 3267(1) (2006).  
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are potentially liable.
134
 A law including such clear language is 
necessary to close the longstanding accountability gap. The 
framework for conducting investigations is another of the bill‘s 
strengths; for decades there has been no legislative guidance as to 
what should be done in the event of a contractor crime.
135
  
While H.R. 2740 is commendable for attempting to take a stance 
against contractor abuses, there is room for improvement. First, while 
H.R. 2740 requires the Justice Department to compose a general 
report that discusses the number of complaints and investigations 
pursued,
136
 the report acts as little more than a fact-finding exercise. 
Once completed, the bill does not prescribe that the report be used for 
anything further.
137
 However, Congress should pass new legislation 
incorporating the language of H.R. 2740 section 3 while also 
requiring the Department of Justice to investigate each complaint it 
receives from the FBI. Given the legal vacuum that has surrounded 
PMFs for the eight years America has carried out operations in the 
Middle East, it is strategically important to demonstrate that 
complaints are taken seriously rather than merely duly noted. Placing 
American troops and contractors in Iraq and Afghanistan engenders 
hostility toward the United States;
138
 demonstrating that the United 
States takes allegations of criminal conduct seriously would be one 
way to repair the country‘s damaged reputation abroad, particularly 
among groups whose support is critical to the success of the United 
States in both its current and future political and military conflicts.  
The United States should not only investigate complaints of 
contractor abuse, but also should provide reparations to those who 
already have suffered such abuse. Reparations, rather than criminal 
prosecutions against the alleged perpetrators, may be appropriate 
because prosecuting contractors under a law that did not exist when 
 
 134. H.R. 2740 § 2(a)(3).  
 135. See supra notes 121–23 and accompanying text. 
 136. H.R. 2740 § 2(b). 
 137. See id.  
 138. See PROGRAM ON INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES, THE IRAQI PUBLIC ON THE US 
PRESENCE AND THE FUTURE OF IRAQ (2006), http://www.worldpublicopinion.org/pipa/pdf/ 
sep06/Iraq_Sep06_rpt.pdf (discussing how a majority of Iraqis supported attacks on American 
troops and wanted the United States to withdraw from Iraq by late 2007). 
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the alleged act occurred raises constitutional questions.
139
 Monetary 
reparations would be a constitutionally sound method for providing 
relief to individuals affected by the accountability gap.
140
 
Reparations do not appear unreasonable, especially given the cost 
of the wars in the Middle East thus far.
141
 High cost, however, is not a 
good reason to spend more money unless such spending is prudent. 
Providing reparations would be strategically valuable, as it would 
demonstrate the United States‘ responsibility for the PMFs it has 
hired and its concern for PMFs‘ actions abroad. The benefits are 
difficult to measure precisely, but, considering the negative opinion 
of the United States in the region and the resulting political 
roadblocks,
142
 using funds in this way should serve the United States‘ 
interests well.  
One of the Bush administration‘s complaints about H.R. 2740 was 
that such a law, if passed, would place a burden on the FBI and the 
Department of Defense.
143
 Investigation and prosecution necessarily 
take both time and resources. Therefore prosecutions of future 
 
 139. Punishing a contractor for an act that may not have been a crime when committed 
could be a violation of the ex post facto clause. See U.S. CONST. art. 1, § 9, cl. 3.  
 140. Investigations of past complaints undoubtedly would be expensive and difficult to 
complete. Garnering the requisite political capital for this proposed change in the law as it 
stands now would not be easy. Reparations would be particularly unpopular as they may set a 
troubling precedent as a way for the government to fix a problem. On the other hand, giving 
money to those affected may not seem like enough. The injury or death of a loved one is not 
easily equated with money. Financial recovery for physical or emotional harms is not an 
uncommon concept, however, in tort law. Indeed, applying such concepts to PMF abuses seems 
like it may be the only way to provide justice to those affected, especially since criminal 
prosecutions for actions that were not crimes under the legal code of the time are likely 
unfeasible.  
 141. For example, five years after the Iraq war began, the Pentagon estimated that the total 
cost already stood at $600 billion. David M. Herszenhorn, Estimates of Iraq War Cost Were Not 
Close to Ballpark, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 19, 2008, at A9. Estimates of the total long-range costs in 
Iraq range from one to four trillion dollars. Id.  
 142. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. See generally PROGRAM ON 
INTERNATIONAL POLICY ATTITUDES, supra note 138.  
 143. The administration expressed concern that ―the bill would place inappropriate and 
unwarranted burdens on the Department of Defense. In addition to their overriding 
responsibility to conduct military operations, the Armed Forces would be required to undertake 
significant duties for the handling and detention of non-DOD contractors covered by the bill.‖ 
OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 18, at 1. The Bush administration also argued that 
H.R. 2740 ―would affirmatively mandate that particular investigative activities of the Federal 
Bureau of Investigation be conducted overseas‖ rather than allowing FBI experts to use their 
judgment to allocate ―resources to the Nation‘s greatest needs.‖ Id. at 1. 
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misconduct should occur in the country of the contingency operation 
in order to reduce the expense of prosecuting in United States courts, 
which already are burdened with high caseloads. Moreover, 
prosecution could be done swiftly and effectively with courts martial. 
This already appears permissible under the 2006 amendment to the 
UCMJ;
144
 however, this provision has not yet been legally tested. 
Because the lack of clarity in the UCMJ has been a deterrent to PMF 
prosecutions under current law, it would be wise to add a provision to 
a law similar to H.R. 2740 that future offenders be tried by courts 
martial. If subjecting civilians to courts martial proved 
constitutionally unpalatable, prosecutions should still take place in 
the country where the contingency operation is, but not under a court 
martial. This would both accelerate the judicial process and reduce 
cost.  
The third improvement that should be made to a new law similar 
to H.R. 2740 concerns the issue of territorial reach. The bill as 
written applies only to contractors who are doing work in an area ―or 
in close proximity to an area . . . where the Armed Forces is 
conducting a contingency operation.‖145 PMFs, however, have carried 
out work on behalf of the United States in places like Latin America 
and Bosnia where no Armed Forces were present.
146
 Without the 
presence of the military, a bill employing the jurisdictional language 
of H.R. 2740 cannot hold such contractors liable. The jurisdictional 
reach of American criminal laws should be extended to areas in 
which the United States contracts with PMFs to participate in a 
contingency operation, whether or not the Armed Forces are present 
or in close proximity.
147
  
 
 144. See supra notes 108–09 and accompanying text. 
 145. MEJA Expansion and Enforcement Act of 2007, H.R. 2740, 110th Cong. § 2(a)(3) 
(2007). 
 146. See Michaels, supra note 16, at 1024. 
 147. This is controversial. As discussed above, sending U.S. troops to places like the 
Balkans and Somalia was not politically feasible. See supra notes 41, 57–60 and accompanying 
text. PMFs provide a deft way to influence regions without spending the requisite political 
capital. It is difficult to measure what kind of harm would result if certain operations are made 
public at the time they occur; national security, for example, arguably could be undermined. 
Therefore, prosecuting PMFs for misdeeds committed in potentially secret operations could 
damage national security if the prosecutions were public. However, prosecutions do not 
necessarily have to be public. In fact, if using a court martial is constitutionally permissible, it 
would not be difficult to prosecute with minimal public scrutiny. Clearly, military secrecy is 
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CONCLUSION 
Since the end of the Cold War, the market of private military 
services has increased dramatically.
148
 The United States military 
relies on PMFs in ever-increasing numbers to supplement its forces in 
Iraq and Afghanistan.
149
 Since September 2007, it is clear that 
contractors have largely been operating in a legal vacuum, creating 
an accountability gap.
150
 H.R. 2740 was an attempt to close that gap, 
but it has several shortcomings. A new law augmenting the language 
of H.R. 2740 should be passed to provide for retrospective 
investigation and reparations. Additionally, prosecutions should 
occur in the same country as the alleged crimes to reduce cost. 
Finally, the bill should apply in any operations where PMFs are 
acting unilaterally on behalf of the United States. With these changes, 
a bill similar to H.R. 2740 will serve as an effective solution to a 
protracted period of legal confusion. 
 
beyond the scope of this paper. It suffices to say that PMFs should be legally accountable in 
situations where they act unilaterally, just as are members of the Armed Forces. 
 148. SINGER, supra note 4, at 230. 
 149. See Gaston, supra note 14, at 223. 
 150. See supra notes 114–21 and accompanying text. 
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